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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of
LLOYD A # FRY COMPANY,
Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)

Case No.
13980

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a Decision of the Utah Air
Conservation Committee finding that emissions from the Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Company plant were in violation of Section 3.2, Code
of Air Conservation Regulations.

RELIEF ON APPEAL
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company seeks a complete judicial
hearing and review of this matter and reversal of a Decision and
Orders entered by the Utah Air Conservation Committee.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to September 4, 1973, the Manager of the Lloyd A.
Fry Roofing Company (Fry) located at Woods Cross, Utah, received
notice from Dr. Grant S. Winn, Executive Secretary of the Utah Air

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Conservation Committee that the emissions from the stacks at the
plant were in violation of Section 3.2.1 of the Code of Air Conservation Regulations which provides:

*

3.2.1 Single sources of emission from existing installations except incinerators and internal
combustion engines shall be of a shade or density
no darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black)
or an equivalent opacity.
On September 4, 1973, an informal meeting was held

between Fry officials, Winn, and other Air Conservation personnel,
during which Fry contended that the emissions were composed mostly
of uncorabined water vapor, which is not a contaminant.

Air Conser-

vation personnel agreed to attend a demonstration at the Fry plant
on September 5, 1973, which Fry asserted would show that the emissions
from the stacks at the plant were 97% water vapor.
On October 18, 1973, Fry officials attended a meeting
with the Utah Air Conservation Committee during which Fry officials
again stated that the emissions from the plant were not in violation
and that enforcement personnel, in reading the emissions (plumes
from the stacks) were not differentiating between uncombined water
vapor and asphalt fumes.
In a letter dated January 16, 1974, Fry was informed by
Winn that the Woods Cross facility was in violation of Section 3.2
of the Visible Emissions Regulations on September 6, 1973; September
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27, 1973; October 3, 1973; October 4, 1973; October 9, 1973; and
November 9, 1973, and Fry was ordered to submit to the Air Conservation office a request for a variance accompanied with a compliance
schedule or cease operation of the plant.

Pursuant to 26-24-11,

Utah Code Annotated, 1953f Fry requested a hearing before the Air
Conservation Committee to answer the charges, which commenced on
April 4, 1974, before a sub-examining committee represented by
William C. Quigley as counsel and John Spencer Snow as legal advisor.
Rex J. Hanson represented Fry.

On April 5, 1974, the hearing was

recessed, reconvened on May 15, 1974, and concluded on that date.
The Hearing Committee affirmed the Order of the Executive Secretary
dated January 16, 1974.
Fry then filed a Motion for Review of the Hearing Committ e e ^ Decision, which was reviewed by the Utah Air Conservation
Committee on December 19, 1974, which affirmed the Decision of the
Hearing Examiners. Representatives of Fry did not attend and were
not invited to attend this meeting.
On January 15, 1975, Fry appealed the Decision of the Air
Conservation Committee to the Third Judicial District Court, which
appeal, pursuant to a Motion filed by the Attorney General, was
dismissed by the Court on January 31, 1975, upon the ground that
the Air Conservation Committee's Order was reviewable only by the
Supreme Court of Utah.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fry then filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Supreme
Court on February 4, 1975.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

THE LAW
In 1967, the 37th Utah Legislature enacted Senate Bill
36# The Air Conservation Act.

Subsequently, the Act has been

amended, in 1969, 1971 and 1973. The substance of the Air Conservation Act is now contained in Utah Code Annotated, Title 26, Chapter
24.
Pursuant to Section 26-24-1.5, the Utah Legislature
declared the public policy and the purpose of the Air Conservation
Act to be:

"(a)

The achievement and maintenance of such levels

of air quality as will protect human health and safety; (b) the
prevention of injury to plant and animal life and property to the
greatest degree possible; (c) the fostering of comfort and convenience of the people; (d) the promotion of economic and social
development of the State of Utah; and (e) the facilitation of enjoyment of the natural attractions of the State of Utah."
Section 26-24-2 sets out the definitions of "air comtamination", "air contaminant source", "air pollution", and additional
definitions having direct application to the creation of the Air
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Conservation Committee or to the Board of Health.

Section 26-24-2

reads as follows:
26-24-2. Definitions. - As used in this act:
(1) "Air contaminant" means any particulate
matter of any gas, vapor, suspended solid, or
any combination thereof, excluding steam and water
vapors.
(2) "Air Contaminant source" means any and
all sources of emissions of air contaminants
whether privately or publicly owned or operated.
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence in
the ambient air of one or more air contaminants
in such quantities and duration and under conditions and circumstances as is or tends to be
injurious to human health or welfare, animal or
plant life, or property, or would unreasonably
interfere with the enjoyment of life or use of
property, as determined by,the standards, rules
and regulations adopted by the air conservation
committee.
***

Under Subsection 1, air contaminant is defined as any particulate
matter or any gas, vapor, suspended solid, or any combination
thereof, excluding steam and water vapors, (emphasis added)
Section 26-24-3 states that the Division of Health shall
have the responsibility for the administration of the Air Conservation Act.

This Section, when read in conjunction with Section 26-15-5,

sets forth the powers and the duties of the Board of Health with
respect to the establishment of rules, regulations and standards.
The Utah Air Conservation Committee was created and established pursuant to the authority set forth in Section 26-24-3.1.
In this Section, the Legislature stated that there was to be created
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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within the Division of Health an air conservation counsel which
has since been amended to read: "The Air Conservation Committee."
This Committee has been delegated the authority to set forth air
quality standards and to determine the maximum amount of contaminants
that may be emitted by any particular source under the law.
The general makeup of the Committee, its purposes and
duties are set forth in Section 26-24-4 through 8.

However, these

powers and duties, dealing with the control of air pollution, must
be read in conjunction with Section 26-24-2(3) which states:
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence in
the ambient air of one or more air contaminants
in such quantities and duration and under conditions
and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious to
human health or welfare, animal or plant life, or
property, or would unreasonably interfere with the
enjoyment of life or use of property as determined
by the standards, rules and regulations adopted
by the air conservation committee, (emphasis added)
In addition, 26-24-5(1) grants the Air Conservation Committee the
power to make rules regarding the control abatement and prevention
of air pollution from all sources and again, in Subsection (2), the
Committee was given the power to establish air quality standards
on a regional basis. Furthermore, Subsection (4) grants the Committee
the power to hold hearings related to any aspect of or matter in the
administration of the Air Conservation Act. Subsection (5) grants
the Committee the power to issue such orders as may be necessary
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to effectuate the purposes of the Air Conservation Act and to enforce these orders by all appropriate administrative and judicial
proceedings and to cause the institution of judicial proceedings to
secure compliance with the Act.

Subsection (12) states that the

Committee shall determine "by means of field studies and sampling
the degree of contamination and air pollution in all parts of the
State."

It is apparent that the Committee is required not only to

conduct field studies, but also must conduct the sampling evaluation to determine possible violators of the Act. The transcript
is void of any evidence whatsoever regarding samples that were taken
or of any field studies given to "smoke readers" to accomplish this
objective.
The procedure that must be followed by the Committee in
adopting standards of quality for ambient air, the notice that must
be given and the hearing requirements are set forth in Section
26-24-10.

In Subsection (2) the Air Conservation Committee is given

broad power "to establish such emissions control requirements, by
rulef regulation or standard as in its judgment may be necessary
to prevent# abate or control air pollution."
The Utah State Board of Health has adopted a Code of
Air Conservation Regulations pursuant to authority of Section
26-24-5 and 26-14-5. Section 3.2, Visible Emissions, of the Code
of Air Conservation Regulations reads:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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3.2.1
Single sources of emission from existing installations except incinerators and internal
combustion engines shall be of shade or density no
darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or
an equivalent opacity.
Section 3.2.6(d) of the Code, Exceptions, states, "An
emission failing to meet the standard because of the effect of
uncombined water shall not be in violation."
Section 1.1.26 of the Code defines:
Ringelmann Chart means the Chart published
by the U. S. Bureau of Mines (Information Circular
7718) which illustrates graduated shades of grey
to black for use in determining the light obscuring
capability of particulate matter.
Section 1.1.31 of the Code defines:
Equivalent opacity means the relationship of
opaqueness or percent obscuration of light to
the Ringelmann Chart for shades other than black
and is approximately equal to the following:
Ringelmann No.

Equivalent Opacity

1
2
3
4
5

20
40
60
80
100

However, this, again, must be read in conjunction with Section
26-24-2(3) which defines air pollution.
No guidelines are set out as to the manner in which an
inspector should make an evaluation or "reading" of the plume to
determine whether the emission is in violation of Section 3.2.1 of
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the Code prohibiting a shade or density no darker than
Ringelmann Chart

(40% black) or aii equivalent opacity; .*..^., „*iat

distance the inspector must be from, the stack, the diameter of the
-* i
time sequence of observations, and
obse. • * j.i>f

n i s niride, Hie number rind

* * circumstances under which the

-

In" *.'^ ti I ual iuni „ pos 11 n JII

of the sun, weather conditions, wind, humidity, < : HI the background
of the plume

The evaluation process depends solely oi i the subjective

judgment of the inspector at the time the smoke reading occurs
(Tr., Vol

' , ' '•

I

pp

49, 50, 51 ) .

•

'

Tt ie sat .i irai it ai id coal: :i nq asphalt i s purchased from

Trumbull Asphalt Company

"tv.j L blown,

:t Woods Cross

\

:.

(Tr., Vol. II,

v-- •••• ^ean^ it has been distilled to the extent

that a "high degree of the volatile oi J s have been dr ivon oil before
it i S

soici

to Frj (Tr., Vol. II, p. 59) . A much higher temperature

I s used in the blowing process than the temperature of the asphalt
when i t is used by Fry to saturate the felt in its manufacturing
process (Tr., Vol, I I , pp. 61, 6 2 ) .
asphalt

Li-' nv i ni i WMII

d e g r e e s , which ,

I

11 vi |

under

its

i n the "blowing process" the
Mush

pomi

h o t t e r than t h e f l a s h p o i n t

,<i

|r

iiinil(

i,hn m

dim

,-. the a s p h a l t in the

,

,f ([in,,,,, asphalt a II, tei:

i t i s " f u l l blown,1"1 ranges from 120 to 140 d e g r e e s
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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;

The specifications Fry receives from Trumbull state the heat loss by
the American Society of Testing Materials (ASTM, D-6) which determines the loss on heating of fumes. Fry's specification requires
that the test be run at temperatures of 465 degrees. At this point,
the heat loss measurement (loss of fumes) equals .67 degrees heat
loss by weight over a period of 8 hours, a heat loss 0.08375 percent
occurs during each hour which is the air contaminant or particulate
emitted by the Fry process (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 117, 118, Ex. 17).
The manufacturing process at the Fry plant in the production of roofing materials involves a roll of asphalt used at the
beginning of a single production line from which the felt is wound
off in loops on a series of rollers into a pre-saturation area where
asphalt heated to a range from 430 to 450 degrees impacts against
one side of the felt, which is composed of 6 to 9 percent moisture
content.

When the asphalt contacts the side of the felt sheet,

moisture is driven off the opposite side in the form of steam. Thereafter, the sheet of felt continues to move in loops around the
rollers into a dip tank where the felt is further saturated and
coated with asphalt on both sides (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 227, 228). It
was uncontroverted that the effect of impacting asphalt on one side
of the felt sheet during the pre-saturating process was to drive out
the moisture content in the form of water vapor from the felt. After
the moisture is driven from the felt, it is caught in overhead metal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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hoods and becomes the major part of the emissions from the |»lanl
(TT „ , Vol, 1, in, <M')) , The amount of particulate or asphalt emitted
during the process is approximately 5 percent of the total emission
or in .1 i".Jt io MI" will PI urnpni l-n asphalt of 20 to 1 ITi",f w^o.. a.,
pp. 229, 230)

There is no combustion involved in the Fry manu

facturing process.

The emissions I'runi I ho pie -sal urah or

- • i-

rator are caught in the hoods and with the aid of a fan are emitted
from two stacks, the greatest density ai id volume beiiM.) emi
the west stack because there is hardly any vapoj left in the felt
sheet after i+- passes through the spraying and dipping operations.
M o , : ' t "'if t |<

< 'apoi- is emitted from the west stack (Tr., v^*. .*.,

pp. 243, 244; Vol. II, pp. 1 34, 1 35; Ex. 1 5E) .
2.
THE FACTS
; On September 5, 1 9 73 , =i1 the :i nvi tat I c: n of Pi" y

Alvin

Rickers, Assistant Chief of Air Qualj ty# Brent Bradford, and Lynn
Price

visileil I lni Wuoth Cross julianl whoi C* they f ihsei' "<»i I I hi i missions

from the stacks during the normal operation of I he plant,
there they examined the emissions when LIio hit

'While

slieHt <*M; in oceed-

ing through the asphalt saturators and also observed the emissions
from the stacks when the felt sheet was '"broken" or when, I:
sheet was i

elt

passing through the asphalt saturators, the purpose

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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being to compare the opacity of the emissions with the water vapor
forced out of the felt and into the stack and the emissions when
the felt was broken, permitting no moisture from the felt to become
part of the emissions.

(Opacity is the amount of limitation or

inhibition which prevents an observer from seeing objects through
a plume; 40 percent opacity means 40 percent of your vision through
the smoke plume is obscured (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 21# 22)). Photographs
were taken of the emissions from the plant during normal operation
and during the operation when the felt was "broken" which show
conclusively that the smoke plume during normal operation is composed
almost entirely of water vapor (Ex. 15f 15A, 15C, 15D and 15E).
Readings of the plume were taken by Alvin Rickers who informed the
Fry people the emissions from the plant during normal operation
were not in violation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 64).
In a letter (Ex. 1 ) , Fry was charged with violations on
six different dates on which readings or evaluations were made by
personnel from the Utah Air Conservation Committee or from the Davis
County Department of Health.

All of these men were graduates of a

smoke school conducted by the Air Conservation Committee.
The course given at the smoke school consisted of the use
of a smoke generator powered by an oil burning furnace which was
so arranged that an air, water or oil mixture could be varied to
produce incomplete combustion, the result being a black or a white
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plume.

The generator stack had attached to it an electric eye

1111 i i ™ JI nil* "d'un t*\\ line npfictlv ill Hit plume record I ess nf

I In r n l o r .

The students were taught by first showing them a p] ume of smoke
and telling them the percent of opacity rivet a per. i -.-

:

Then the student had the opportunity of reviewing the procedure
on a basis of comparison from what they had been to] d i n i t i a l l y •
(Tr

f

V c >]

I, p|: > 1 5 |( ] 6) . The school lasted for approximately

three days (Ti ' , Vt : J!

I ,' p. 20)

However, there was no method ut-

il i zed! at Llie school ai id 1:1 i< 3 h I, m Ienil s wr.M e nut I iranied I u i cini a
smoke plume which was partially composed c\
"wet plume" (

Vol , I ,, p. 23)

f

" •

«•*••

vapor, called a

-

in

the opacity estimates given by the students and the training must
be repeated often.

Sometimes, i t took the whole course of" three

d a y s , or coiiti n/iia] repetitioi I to get some student's "eyeballs
calibrated" so they could make estimates that met the requirements
(Ti ,, Villi

II 11

"«J|

As stated, t h e r e wa,< im Itaiinintf aya n J al >l o

for the reading of a wet plume other than experience in the field
W

•

(

'

plume after the moisture had evaporated out
The determinate

.

.,r; ,.

/ ^

ap. .

3

* .* v
,

-/aporatea

f

the plume depends upon the judgment of the reader (Vol. I, pp. 50,
51).

The distance the plume travels before the water vapor is

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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dissipated depends upon the weather conditions, the amount of
humidity in the air, and a "number of other things" (Tr., Vol. I,
pp. 73, 74).

There is no other process in the State of Utah where

felt is saturated with asphalt as occurs in the Fry plant (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 75), and none of the smoke readers who read the emissions
from the Fry plant as being in violation; that is, of a density
darker than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or an equivalent
opacity, had any prior training in reading or evaluating plumes with
the same or similar composition of water vapor as that contained in
the Fry plumes. No tests had ever been made to determine the subjective variations on reading which would exist between the different
smoke readers (Tr., Vol. I, p. 31). There are various factors,
such as humidity, temperature, time of day, position of the sun,
and background beyond the plume, which must be considered in making
a proper evaluation of the density of a plume (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 32,
33).

It is generally more difficult for students to get their

eyes calibrated to reading white smoke than it is for the student
to read black smoke (Tr., Vol. I, p. 36). The evaluations are made
by smoke readers in the field without any monitoring devices (Tr.,
Vol. I, p. 43). Any water vapor in the plume creates greater opacity
and would make the plume more difficult to evaluate (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 43). Therefore, the determination of opacity is made upon the
smoke reader's subjective observation and judgment (Tr-' Vol. I, p.49).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The first date on which an alleged violation occurred
was September 6, 1973, whereupon an I nspector found the west stack
of \\ui

Fry t»I*;<"H"if in havo an emission of between 45 percent to

60 percent opacity; no reading was made of the east stack (Prosecution l-ix, I In

I )

The 4l) percent to

< A -^

edly represent - 'hr- highest and lowest

>f

ki,

t opacity rmiqe ail le<j

' readings made oi: I that

date (Recort . m d i n g s of Fact an< I C< ... usions of I «aw and Decision,
dated October x,, 1974).

However, the transcript is void of any

evidence to support this charge or any evidence that Fry was in
vii >1alien of the Utah Code of Air Conservation Regulations, Section
3.2,

Alvin Rickers, Winn's assistant . ? estified that i - v

7 percent varia bion r

.

.

individuals (Tr., Vol

. . i* .

J

>< -•

'

: s«-

" --

,
: blowing for error

of 5 percent, i f tliii s inspector road I lie* op-to it y il im p e r c e n t ,
such was not a violation.
The second date on whi ch an alleged violation occurred
was September 27, 1973, wherein George R. Chlarson, an employee of
the Utah State Division of Health, Air Quality Section, read the
east stack of the Fry plant to have an emission of between 35 percent
to 55 percent opacity,.
emission I rem I In1 wi'sl

Apparently, there was no reading made of: the
.1 iiok I li.nl iiil.e,

IIM*H ,,|.,III

(ho IS In I'I

cent opacity alleged represented the highest and lowest of seven
readings made that day (Prosecution Ex. ]

10; Record, Findings of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Fact# Conclusions of Law and Decision dated October 17, 1974). The
original evaluation made by Chlarson was outside the premises of
the Fry plant some 200 feet from the stack (Tr., Vol. I, p. 138).
Subsequently, these findings were presented to a Mr. Springer, the
Office Manager of the Fry plant (Tr., Vol. I, p. 138). The evaluation of Chlarson began at 11:00 and lasted about 1 hour and 55
minutes.

However, the testimony is uncontroverted that when the

moisture is driven from the felt by the impact of the hot asphalt,
the moisture is caught in an over-head hood which is emitted from
the west stack.

It is impossible for the east stack to have a more

dense emission than the west stack (Tr., Vol. II, p. 134), which
certainly effects the credibility of Chlarson's observation or reading.
The third day an alleged violation occurred was October
3, 1973. On that date Richard L. Harvey, an Administrator of
the Environmental Health Services for the Davis County Health Depart
ment made one observation and found emissions from the west stack
of the Fry plant to have an opacity of 55 percent and an emission
from the east stack had an opacity of 30 percent (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 148, 155; Prosecution Ex. 1, 11; Record, Findings of Fcict, Conclusions of Law, and Decision dated October 17, 1974).

The reading

occurred at approximately 12:44 p.m. on the County right-of-way
which is 1500 South at Woods Cross, Utah (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 147-149).
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At this time the reading was taken approximately 200 to 300 f:ef?l
from the stack (Tr, Vo]

T, p . IS VI . T h e p l u m e h a d travels d

approximately 46 to 50 ieet iiom the lip of the stack before the
reading was made (Tr., Vol. I, p. 1 54).
and memorrindur

However, Harvey's notes

ufcato no est" i.mate :i)f d i stance with respect to when

dissipation ^ water vapor occurred from the plume and the distance
from whic

wh», • 11 t 111 *. read i rig war. t ak e in

.

(Prosecution E x . N o . l l f 1 2 ) .

- • -\ \wU.

-^^

lasted for approximately 30 second-

•>: o b s e r v a t i o n w h i c h
, 155, ] 57).

Furthermore, the sun was approximately overhea 3 i* this time i n a
s o u t h e a s t e r l y d i r e c t i o n , and w a s n o t at hi/, back
p.

••

(Tr., VoJ , 11 „

.

The fourth date on whi ch an alleged violation occurred
w a s O c t o b e r -J

AI I hair I, i me Brent: C! Urarlford,

i n Ifliii1 irou -

mental Health Specialist for the Utah State Division of Health,
Q u a l i t y S e c t i o n , v i s i t e d the F r y plant

p u r p o s e nl nuikiwi «JII

e v a l u a t i o n o f t h e e m i s s i o n s from that p l a n t (Tr., V o l ,
114)

B r a d f o r d h a d b e e n at. the F r y p l a n t o n Septembei

I m i, Inn f
'•, I'M.i, it

the invitation of the Fry people (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 108). On October
4, 1974, Bradford entered the Fry property without their permission
ami tTie.ru-1> m.nir .HI i^val u.'ii ion o f H i e e m i s s i o n from f:'he plant" (Ti
V o l . T, p • 114)

The evaluation occurred at approximately 10:05

a.m. approximately

feet from the stack.

However, at the smoke
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school they were taught that evaluations should occur at a distance
from the stack of approximately 2h times the length of the stack
(Tr., Vol. I, p. 117). The standard procedure in reading a smoke
plume is to have the sun at the smoke reader's back (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 119). The evaluation by Bradford lasted approximately 45 minutes
and at that time he found emissions from the west stack averaging
between 40 percent to 50 percent (Prosecution Ex. 9 ) . However, the
charges set forth in the Executive Secretary1s letter of January 16,
1974, allege opacity of the west stack emission at 40 percent and the
east stack at 55 percent (Prosecution Ex. 1 ) . Furthermore, there is
no

record of any emission from the east stack as being in violation

of the regulations.

Bradford's analysis dealt only with the west

stack (Prosecution Ex. 9 ) . The transcript is void of any evidence
with respect to a violation of the east stack on October 4, 1973.
When Bradford made the evaluation of the plume emitting from the
Fry plant, it contained water vapor.

The only training that Brad-

ford had had in the reading of a plume containing water vapor was
in an asphalt mulch plant somewhere in the State of Utah (Tr., Vol. I,
pp. 120, 121). Furthermore, Bradford stated that the length of time
one observed an emission was not discussed at the smoke reading
school, nor was it covered in any of their studies (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 130). During the reading taken by Bradford, he was approximately
100 to 125 feet from the stack.

His evaluation was that the opacity
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in the emission immediately above the lip of the stack was approximately 80 to 90 percent, but that where the watei vapmi rJi sh i paten 1
i

- - . ranged from ^

Ex.

Howevei

c .

.

^>:

^

^

percent (Prosecution

:nes with his estimate which was given
;

-,l.cil. of! l

40 and 55 percer*

*

••

ranged between

Bradford concluded that in
> elines

making his evaluation ; . ; * - ,
taught at the smoke school , His testimony •- -

follows:

Q. And, I think you are trained in smoke school
to make these evaluations about two and a half
times the length of the stack?
1
(.

That's ':!••' school book solution, yes.
i no, ill your opinion?

2
• •• a guideline, yes. But, uiily as a guideline. Obviously, you can't always get the two
and a half times the stack distance away from.
Q. If you follow the guidelines there, there
is more probability that your evaluation would
be accurate, woul d i t not?
•: :: A # i don't "know that 1 am prepared to answer
that.
Q. Isn't that why you were given those guidelines in your training, to get the most accurate
evaluation possible?
A. Again, I would assume so. I don!t know that
I would be prepared to answer that as far as being
able to determine what would be the best. That's
what the school book answers, that's all II can say ,
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Q* Well, you would agree that the guidelines
have some value or you wouldn't be taught them,
would you?

\: t nr

A. Well, I would agree that someone takes an
absolute value. I don't know—again, I don't know
that I am in a position to judge that (Tr., Vol. I,
pp. 117, 118) .

, . ./•
,fj

The fifth date on which a violation allegedly occurred

;.:

was October 9, 1973 (Prosecution Ex. 1 ) . On that date William H.
Terburg, an Environmental Health Specialist with the Davis County
Health Department visited the Fry plant for the purpose of
evaluating the effluent from their stacks (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 212214).

On that date Terburg made one reading which lasted approxi-

mately 5 minutes and found both stacks with emissions of between
40 to 60 percent opacity at a point 20 feet above the stacks
(Prosecution Ex. 13, 1 4 ) . The evaluation occurred at approximately
11:20 a.m. at approximately 150 feet west of the stack on 15th
South (Tr., Vol. I, p. 215). Terburg stated that at 20 feet above
the stack the plume was void of any water vapor (Tr., Vol. I, p. 218)
At that time, there was a slight breeze which changed during the
evaluation (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 218-221).

However, there is no indi-

cation as to what his reading actually represented or whether it
was just an estimate or a range that existed in the opacity of the
plume.

Furthermore, there was no indication of the highest and

lowest point that existed on that date (Record, Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and Decision dated October 17, 1974).
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emission from neither stack was in violation if the reading was
40 percent; his testimony that the density of emissions from the
east and west stack was equal is incredible considering the uncontroverted evidence that emission from the west stack contains most
of the water vapor and is always more dense than the emission from
the east stack.
The sixth date on which Fry was charged with violation was
November 9, 1973, whereupon Alvin E. Rickers and Casper Nelson, made
a visit to the Fry plant. Alvin Rickers is employed by the Utah
State Division of Health as Assistant Chief of the Air Quality
Section. Rickers assists in teaching at the smoke school in the
area of meteorology.

The instruction is given at the school that

the reading should be made from 6 to 12 inches above the stack.
The reason, of course, for doing it at that point is that the
electric eye is reading the opacity at the top of the stack and
evidently dissipation occurs at a rapid rate (Tr., Vol. I, p. 55).
Rickers stated that opacity is the decrease in transmittance of
light. His training in determining the "break point" in a plume
where the water vapor evaporated or dissipated from the plume
consisted of a one-time observance of a plume from Kennecott Copper
Corporation, which does not have the same process as Fry (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 74). On November 9, 1973, Rickers made four readings over a
period of 12 minutes at 3-minute intervals, in three out of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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four readings the east stack was found to have a 50 percent opacity,
the fourth reading was of 45 percent opacity.

The west stack was

found to have a 40 percent opacity on two readings and a 45 percent
opacity reading on two readings (Prosecution Ex. 4 (card)). However,
the charges made for that date reflected 45 percent opacity on the
west stack and 50 percent opacity on the east stack (Prosecution Ex.
1).

Furthermore, the Findings of Fact of October 17, 1974, show a

single reading occurring on November 9, 1973. An apparent discrepancy exists in the Prosecution's evidence (See Prosecution
Ex. 9; Record, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decision
dated October 17, 1974).

In addition, Rickers' evaluation was that

there was 90 percent opacity at the lip of the east stack and 80
percent opacity at the lip of the west stack.

However, after

dissipation, the opacity in the east stack was 50 percent and the
opacity of the emission from the west stack was 45 percent.

This

is clearly inconsistent with the record.
Dr. Dale Parker who has a PhD Degree in Environmental
Biology from the University of Utah was called by Fry as a defense
witness.

Although not certified by the smoke school, Dr. Parker

had worked 21 years at Dugway and had extensive experience with
wet clouds or plumes (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 224, 225). In his testimony
he described the entire Fry process and explained that the average
temperature of the asphalt when it impacts the felt is 430 degrees
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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3
I
1

to 450 degrees. The felt sheet is composed of 6 to 9 percent moisture
content# which is driven off on the felt side opposite from point of
impact with the asphalt in the form of steam.

From that point the

steam goes through a cooling process as it is emitted from the
stacks.

He estimated the amount of particulate or asphalt in the

plume is less than five percent.
process.

No combustion takes place in the

The ratio is 20 to 1 of water to asphalt (Tr.# Vol. I,

pp. 227-230).

In his opinion the emissions from the Fry plant could

not be in violation of the 40 percent opacity test during normal
operation (Tr., Vol. I# p. 254). In his opinion the testimony of
the smoke readers was based strictly on their ability to read
opacity of a plume and not on their ability to differentiate between
a wet plume and a dry plume (Tr.# Vol. I, p. 256).
Raymond L. Chaffinf a defense witness, testified that he
was Chief Chemist for the Environmental Test Group of Core Laboratories.

He has been a certified smoke reader since May of 1971

(Tr.# Vol. II, pp. 66, 67). He had observed the plume emitted
from the Fry plant and was unable to observe any line of demarcation where the moisture came out of the emission or plume (Tr.#
Vol. II, pp. 69, 70). In the smoke schools the students are not
given any training in reading a wet plume and any evaluation of
the opacity of a wet plume is only a guess.

In his opinion, the

reading of a wet plume is completely subjective (Tr., Vol. II, pp.
71, 72).
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Donald D. Foster, a Chemical Engineer and Director of
the Environmental Control for Fry, testified that Fry is in compliance with the EPA Weight Emission Regulations as they relate
to the State of Utah and the Wasatch Front (Tr., Vol. II, p. 121).
On the dates of the alleged violations, he had computed from
company records the percentage of water vapor in the plume as
compared to asphalt fumes. The percentage ranged from 97 percent
to 98 percent (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 139, 140). He had observed
plumes from the Fry Woods Cross plant 40 or 50 times, and had never
observed a sharp break or definite break inthe plume, "It seemed
to sort of drift off and dissipate."

(Tr., Vol. II, p. 142). There

is no distillation of the asphalt in the Fry process (Tr.ir Vol. II,
p. 145). The difference between the Fry process and the process in
asphalt mulch plants is that in the latter there is combustion
(Tr., Vol. II, pp. 150, 151). Equivalent opacity is another term
for the Ringelmann Chart.

It is important in accuratly reading a

plume of any type to take readings in a sequence or series of
intervals of time, because of variations in the speed of manufacturing process, changes in air temperature and wind direction
(Tr., Vol. II, pp. 151, 152, 153). The emissions from the Fry
plant on the dates of the alleged violation were not in violation
of Section 3.2 of the Air Conservation Code (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 160,
161).
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The Air Conservation Committee called Carl D. Luedtke#
an EPA Consultant as a rebuttal witness.

He has a Bachelor1s

Degree in Chemical Engineering and a Master's Degree in Chemistryf
and had qualified as a smoke reader (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 166, 167).
His experience with asphalt saturators was in the Los Angeles area,
none of which were Fry plants; they were equipped with emission
control devices, but used a similar process to that of Fry (Tr.,
Vol. II, pp. 169, 170). He had never read the Fry plume (Tr.,
Vol. II, p. 194). He had observed the Fry plume on one occasion
while on an inspection tour of the facility as an EPA consultant
(Tr., Vol. II, p. 194). In his opinion, based upon assumptions
that the dip-tanks in a Celbtex plant in California were similar
in dimension to those of the Fry plant, the "break felt" test
was not reliable to show the percentage of water vapor in the
plume (Tr., Vol. II, p. 183). However, Foster testified that the
assumptions made by Luedtke were incorrect in that the Fry tanks
were smaller, the asphalt cools after saturating the felt, distillation does not take place, and only minimal fumes come off the
asphalt (Tr., Vol. II, pp. 210-217).

Luedtke was also of the

opinion that taking the average of consecutive readings at intervals was not a more accurate way of determining opacity, despite
his admission that there would be a variance in subjective readings
made by the same individual.(Tr., Vol. II, pp. 207, 208). Luedtke
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also testified that there was no connection between particulate
matter and opacity (Tr., Vol. II, p. 187), which is contra to the
well accepted fact that the smaller the pieces of particulate
therein, the more dense is the plume.
There was no evidence from any source that the emission
from the Fry plant "is or tends to be injurious to human health
or welfare, animal or plant life or property."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE HAS THE BURDEN
OF PROVING ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION,
INCLUDING THE ABSENCE OF VISIBLE WATER VAPOR
The State of Utah, through its administrative agency,
the Air Conservation Committee, is the party seeking relief in
this action.

Obviously, it has the burden of proving all elements

of its case.
The letter from Dr. Grant Winn to Fry dated January 16,
1974, charges Fry with violations of Utah's Visible Emissions
Regulations, Section 3.2, Code of Air Conservation Regulations.
Apparently, the Subsection of 3.2 claimed to have been violated
is:
3.2.1 Single sources of emission from existing
installations except incinerators and internal combustion engines shall be of shade or density no darker
than a No. 2 Ringelmann Chart (40% black) or an equivalent opacity.
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Section 3.2.6 states:
d. An emission failing to meet the
standard because of the effect of uncombined
water shall not be in violation.
which conforms to 26-24-2, which excludes water vapor as a
contaminant.
The violation alleged against Fry is criminal in nature,
and the State has the burden or proving each and every element of
the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

It is an essential element

of the State's case to prove that on the dates charged, the Fry
plume either contained no visible water vapor at all, or that such
visible water vapor was taken into account and excluded when the
opacity reading was made. Again, equivalent opacity in excess
of the Ringelmann Chart is not a violation if the opacity (inhibition of transfer of light through plume) is caused by water vapor.
This requires the State to prove a negative proposition which does
not in any way shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The
general rule is stated in 1 Jones on Evidence, § 5:8:

*

As stated in an earlier section a part of the
plaintiff's burden may lie in the necessity
of proving a negative assertion as an element
of his claim. This is true not only as to the
plaintiff but also as to other parties to this
action, and it may be said that whoever asserts
a claim or defense that is negative in form or
depends upon a negative proposition has the
burden of establishing the truth of the assertion. This is only another way of saying that
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he who affirms must prove; and in cases involving negative propositions the courts seem not
to have regarded the form of the issue as
material.
In reading the transcript, one gets the unmistakable impression
that it was Fry rather than the Committee which had the burden
of proof.

Because of continuous communication between the Hearing

Examiners, the State and Federal EPA personnel during recess outside of the presence of defense counsel, it was necessary to make
an objection, which was sustained by the Legal Advisor (Tr., Vol. I,
p. 127).
POINT II
THE STATE HAS NOT MET THE BURDEN OF PROVING
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED VIOLATION
The evidence is uncontroverted that in making the "readings"
which were the basis for the charges that the Fry plume violated the
Visible Emissions Regulations, the observers relied only on their
subjective judgment; no scientific aids or equipment were used.

In

fact, a Ringelmann Chart was not used because the Fry plume was
white in color, which required the observer to evaluate the plume
on the basis of equivalent opacity; that is, to compare in his
mind the shade of density of the Fry plume with what he remembered
as being No. 2 density on the Ringelmann Chart. A traffic policeman may be able to distinguish between an automobile traveling at
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a

speed of 20 miles per hour and one going twice as fast. He may

not need a speedometer or radar to make this evaluation, yet no one
would suggest that a 20 mile-per-hour speed limit should be enforced
solely by the policeman's visual judgment.

It is common knowledge

that we all view things differently and two people with 20-20 eyesight
may still have a totally different perception of the same physical
object, especially with respect to such intangibles as color, shade,
tone# intensity, etc.

If one ever attempted to purchase a shade of

paint to match another shade (seen only a few minutes earlier) the
difficulty in correctly matching the desired shade would be apparent.
The description of the smoke school curriculum set forth
at length in the Statement of Facts will not be repeated here.
Suffice it to say, the State would close down this plant based
upon the subjective testimony of graduates of a 3-day course, whose
training consisted of observing the degree of opacity of a plume
of smoke, absent any water vapor under controlled conditions.

In

attempting to evaluate the Fry emissions the "smoke reader" would
observe the Fry plume under varying weather conditions and then try
to compare the plume with an image from memory learned at an earlier
time during his school training.

The school did not, and could not,

give any training on evaluating the opacity of a wet plume. The
training for analyzing wet plumes consisted of the observer, accompanied by an "experienced observer," making one or two observations
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of a wet plume in the field, emitted from a process vastly different from the Fry manufacturing process*

The Fry process does not

involve combustion as does the process used in asphalt mulch plants
which contain much more particulate and would tend to cause moisture
to separate or dissipate from the plume more readily.

The diffi-

culty in reading the Fry plume is enhanced by the requirement that
opacity be evaluated after the water vapor has dissipated from the
cloud, which would be subject to varying wind conditions, humidity
and light conditions.

The testimony was clear that the temperature

of the emission as it leaves the stack is higher than that of the
ambient air.

Obviously, the plume would be subject to a cooling

action beginning on the edges which would cause a gradual condensation of vapor from the plume starting on the outside and proceeding
in a gradual manner towards the center as the plume expanded geometrically in moving away from the lip of the stack (Tr., Vol. I, p. 226).
There was evidence that it is desirable to "re-calibrate
the eyeballs" of a smoke reader every six months, because the training does wear off.

However, there was no evidence offered as to

how fast it wears off, whether gradually or in sudden increments or
whether the degree to which it wears off varies with individuals.
Furthermore, there was no evidence of the visual acuity of any of
the observers who made the readings on which the charges were based.
Exhibit 3, a study made by the U.S. Department of Health, Education
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and Welfare, in 1967, contains studies on page 28 which show the
wide variation which 6 allegedly trained plume observers can derive
in observing a plume whose opacity is measured by scientific instrumentation.

Indeed, it should be noted here that the smoke school

training course used a photo electric eye to measure the accuracy
of the students' readings.

In Portland Cement v. Ruckelshaus, 486

F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) the court severely questioned the ability
of a visual observer to read plume opacity and indeed, sent back
for further consideration a 10% opacity standard promulgated by the
EPA.

The court pointed out that the fact that visual observation

may be "a cheaper and faster method of determining compliance,"
but that fact would not suffice to uphold a method of enforcement
which was otherwise illegal. See general discussion at 486 F.2d
pp. 400-401. See also, Essex Chemical v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d
427 (D.C. Cir. 1973) at p. 432.
In Bortz Coal Company v. Air Pollution Commission, 279
A.2d 388 (Pennsylvania)# the company was charged with permitting
smoke to emanate from its stack which was darker than #2 of the
Ringelmann Smoke Chart.

This charge was based on the visual obser-

vation of a State employee.

In overturning the finding of the

Air Pollution Commission, the Court ruled:
Visual test and observations are not
adequate evidence of a violation where
recognized scientific tests are available.
(279A.2d at 398).
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We anticipate that the Respondent will rely on State vs.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company, 495 P.2d 750 (Ore. App. 1972) for
affirmance of the Air Conservation Committee's decision.

There was

no showing that the operation of the Oregon plant was the same as
the Woods Cross plant.

The evidence in that case was uncontroverted

that the plume from the Oregon plant was a wet plume; i.e., the
emission from the stack included water droplets.

The Court held

the decision of the lower court involved a jury question; that because
of the nature of the training given smoke readers as to wet plumes,
the admissibility of their testimony presented a close question, but
since they testified the defendant's plume obscured 80 percent or
more of the background (more than twice the 40 percent required to
constitute a violation) and since there was no showing that the amount
of visible water in defendant's plume could have had a substantial
impact on the readings, the Court resolved the close question of
admissibility in favor of the State.
In the case at Bar there was a substantial showing as to
the amount of water vapor in the emission, and in no instance was
a reading made as high as 80 percent.

Furthermore, the evaluations

of the Fry plume were made in a haphazard manner in which the inspectors used no uniform guidelines.
The witness, Chlarson, made seven readings on September
27, 1973, on the east stack, of which three were in violation, the
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highest being 55 percent.

Nothing more than a "wisp at times" was

observed from the west stack.

The testimony was uncontroverted

that the heaviest emission comes from the west stack.
The witness, Harvey, made one thirty-second observation
on October 3; admitted he did not follow guidelines recommended at
the smoke school (Tr.f Vol. I, p. 155# Ex. 11).
The witness, Bradford, on October 4, 1973, commenced his
evaluation at 10:00 a.m., the first observation being outside the
company property about 200 feet from the stacks, and completed his
observations on company property.

In addition, his entrance on

company property was without permission.

The wind was minimal; he

did not estimate wind velocity, nor could he tell exactly the direction
of the wind (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 117-120).
minutes.

His observation lasted fifty

Normally, he would take readings every five minutes. He

was unable to give the minutes and seconds of how long he looked at
the plume during each observation.

He had made prior evaluations

from asphalt mulch plants (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 120-130).

He wrote the

results of his observations on a business card and gave it to
Springer, Fry's Office Manager.

In a summary contained in a letter

to Winn, he said the emissions from the west stack averaged 40 to
50 percent (Ex. 9 ) ; 40 percent was not in violation and the additional 50 percent could easily be accounted for by subjective variation.
The letter of January 16, 1974, listing the dates on which Fry was
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charged with violations showed the west stack at 40 percent, the
east stack 50 percent, which was amended at the hearing to show
the east stack was not in violation.
The witness, William Terburg, testified to a reading of
the Fry plume on October 9, 1973. He made one continuous observation for five minutes from 11:25 until 11:30 a.m.

His evaluation

of the emission from both stacks was 40 percent to 60 percent
(Ex* 13). He did not know whether the sun, which at that time
would not have been to his back, had any effect on the accuracy of
his evaluation (Tr., Vol. I, p. 220).
The witness, Alvin E. Rickers, on November 9, 1973, at
11:25 to 11:33 a.m., took two readings of each of the stacks, which
he wrote on a business card which he gave to Springer, the Fry Office
Manager.

He read the emissions from the east stack higher than

those of the west stack despite the uncontroverted evidence that
the heaviest emission exits from the west stack.

In this, his

testimony is not consistent with the majority of the other smoke
readers.

The business card says nothing about the circumstances

or weather conditions under which the evaluations were made.

In a

memorandum of that date to Winn, he gave more detailed information,
other than the number of readings which was not mentioned in the
memorandum.
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The lack of uniformity and variance between the evaluations made by the foregoing witnesses certainly casts reasonable
doubt on whether the emissions from the Fry plant were in violation
of the "40 percent equivalent opacity11 regulation.
Considering the penalties provided by the Statute as
punishment for violations of the Code of Air Conservation Regulations , due process would certainly require that Fry be notified in
advance of the emission evaluations so that arrangements could be
made to obtain evidence to rebut the charges.

In any event, the

notice of violation should apprise Fry of the circumstances existing when the evaluations were made.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the charges of
the Air Conservation Committee are not supported by substantial
evidence.

Substantial evidence is defined in Bortz Coal Co. v,

Air Pollution Commission, supra., as follows:
"substantial evidence" is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, and
more is required than a mere scintilla of
evidence or suspicion of the existence of
the fact to be accomplished.
POINT III
THE DECISION OF THE AIR CONSERVATION COMMITTEE FINDING FRY IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 3.2.1 OF THE CODE OF
AIR CONSERVATION REGULATIONS IS IN VIOLATION OF
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND
AMENDMENT XIV, SECTION 1 OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
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Section 26-24-2(3) of the Air Conservation Act defines
pollution as follows:
(3) "Air pollution" means the presence of
ambient air of one or more air contaminants in
such quantities and duration and under conditions
and circumstances as is or tends to be injurious
to human health or welfare, animal or plant life,
or property, or would unreasonably interfere with
the enjoyment of life or use of property, as determined by the standards, rules, and regulations
adopted by the air conservation committee.
There was no evidence that the emissions from the Fry
plant caused or tended to cause any of the deleterious effects
listed in the foregoing statute.

Opacity does not equal pollution.

A wet plume can be 100 percent opaque even though it contains no
pollutants whatsoever.

Anyone who has observed steam from boiling

water knows this pure water vapor can be totally opaque.
The evidence adduced at this hearing shows that eyeball
plume readings in the field cannot be made with reasonable precision and opacity and even if it could be measured precisely,
is not an adequate measure of the amount of pollution the plume
contains.

The Committee^ witnesses conceded that subjective varia-

tion between observers could reach 7 percent and possibly 10 percent.
See also the results of the tests conducted in the study under the
auspices of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(ex. 3, p. 28) which shows the wide variation in the observations
of six allegedly trained observers of a plume whose opacity was
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measured by scientific instruments, variations in stack diameter,
gas velocity, moisture content, weather and light conditions will
cause plumes to have different opacities even though they contain
the same weight of pollutants.

Inspectors are not taught, and

probably couldn't be taught, how to subjectively evaluate these
variables.
The fact that water vapor is excluded in determining
whether the emission violates opacity standards in confirmation of
the fact that opacity caused by water vapor is not a violation.

The

committee's witnesses contend that they could evaluate the opacity
of the plume at a point after the water vapor had dissipated from
the plume. Considering multiple variables, there is no scientific
foundation for the contention that the point where all of the water
vapor has left the plume can be accurately determined, so that only
the opacity attributable to the particulates can be evaluated.
"Due process" prohibits the use of opacity limits as
a legal standard, because the opacity cannot be measured accurately
and cannot be reliably correlated with pollution.

Section 3.2.1 of

the Code of Air Conservation Regulations should be held invalid as
a violation of "due process" if reasonable men can differ on whether
there was a violation.

The probability of such differences between

the evaluations of the Committee's witnesses in uncontroverted.
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Section 3.2.1 does not conform to 26-24-2(3) of the Air Conservation
Act, since the degree of opacity does not equal the degree of pollution and the statute is directed to the control of air pollution.
Therefore, Section 3.2.1 should be held invalid.

Violation of

Section 3.2.1 creates a conclusive presumption that a degree of
opacity of a shade or density darker than No. 2 Ringelmann Chart
(40% black) or an equivalent opacity, is irrebuttable proof of the
degree of air pollution.

Similar legislation has been held invalid

by the U.S. Supreme Court in the recent case of Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441 (1973).

In that case "a state statute established

different tuition rates for resident and non-resident students
and adopted the student's legal address at the time of application
as the sole criterion for determining his residency throughout the
entire period of attendance.

Students who had applied from out of

state but had acquired all of the attributes of bona fide residency
brought suit.

Sustaining an injunction against enforcement of the

statute, the court said:
In sum, since Connecticut purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates
for tuition and fees at its university system,
it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to
deny an individual the resident rates on the
basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption
of nonresidence, when that presumption is not
necessarily or universally true in fact, and
when the State has reasonable alternative means
of making the crucial determination. Rather,
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standards of due process
allow such an individual
present evidence showing
resident entitled to the

require that the State
the opportunity to
that he is a bond fide
in-state rates.

See also, U.S.D.A. v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508 (1973), and Cleveland
Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).

POINT IV
THE AIR CONSERVATION ACT IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL POWER
Section 26-24-10(1) of the Act requires the Air Conservation Committee to conduct public hearings in adopting the standards
of quality for ambient air. Subsection (2) of this Act states:
(2) The committee may establish such emission
control requirements by rule, regulation or
standards as in its judgment may be necessary
to prevent, abate, or control air pollution.
These requirements may be for the state as a
whole or may vary from area to area, as may be
appropriate to facilitate accomplishment of
the purposes of this act, and in order to
take account of varying local conditions. In
adopting these emission control requirements,
the committee shall conduct public hearings in
the same manner and under the same terms and
conditions and with the same notice as required
in subsection (1) of this section.
Even though the Committee is required to conduct public hearings,
the Statute does not say that the Committee is required to consider,
take into account, or in any way be governed by information obtained
at the hearings.

In fact, it may disregard any such information.

Committee may adopt whatever regulations it feels
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to prevent, abate or control air pollution, with no restraint or
guidance from the Legislature.

It is the judge and jury of what

regulations should be adopted to achieve air quality.

As was said

by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
55 S.Ct. 837:
The delegated power * * * is not canalyzed
within banks that keep it from overflowing. It
is unconfined and vagrant.
The Act does not set out any definite standards to guide the
Air Conservation Committee other than its discretion as to what
is good and proper for the safety and health of the public.

Section

26-24-11(1)(b) requires the Executive Secretary shall be conference,
conciliation and pursuasion endeavor to eliminate the violation
before written notice is served as provided in Subsection A.

The

extent, duration and scope of such efforts are to be determined
within the sole discretion of the Executive Secretary.

This appears

to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power or even to
a certain extent a delegation of judicial authority.
Section 26-24-13(1)(a) sets out penalties for violation
of the Act:
(1)(a) Any person who violates any provision
of this act, or any rule, regulation, order (other
/-:/'o;to- ' than an order requiring compliance with an implementation plan), or standard in force under this
act, other than section 26-24-16, or who causes or
permits to be caused air pollution as defined in
section 26-24-2 of any air resource of the state,
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shall be guilty of an offense and subject to a
fine of not more than $10,000 for each day of
violation. Any person who knowingly violates any
requirement of an applicable implementation plan
adopted by the committee more than thirty days
after having been notified in writing, by the executive secretary, that such person is violating such
requirement, shall be guilty of an offense and
subject to a fine of not to exceed $25,000 for
each day of violation in the case of a first offense,
and not to exceed $50,000 for each day of violation
in the case of second and subsequent offenses. Any
person who violates any order requiring such person
to comply with the requirements of an implementation plan shall be guilty of an offense and subject to a fine of not to exceed $25,000 for each
day of violation in the case of a first offense,
and not to exceed $50,000 for each day of violation
in the case of second and subsequent offenses.
Note that a person "guilty of an offense" is subject to the
penalties listed.

If this offense is criminal, which it appears

to be, defendant is entitled to a jury trial in accordance with
77-1-8 U.C.A., 1953. At the commencement of the hearing before
the Examining Committee, Appellant expressly stated that by participating in the hearing, Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company was not
waiving its right to a jury trial; that it purpose in appearing
was to cooperate with the Committee and follow the Statute as it
now exists, despite doubt concerning its constitutionality.
The Act is so vague, especially with reference to the
procedures required and the type of action involved, that it fails
to meet reasonable constitutional standards of exactness and specificity.
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CONCLUSION
No one can deny the laudable objective of the Clean Air
Act, and the sincerity of the Air Conservation Committee in
promulgating its regulations to achieve air quality; however, it
is no

less important that constitutional and legal safeguards of

long established rights be not swept away in this "Ecology"' age.
On the record, we submit that this Court should reverse the decision
of the Utah Air Conservation Committee and remand the matter for
judgment in favor of Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Company.
Respectfully submitted,
WADSWORTH & RUSSON
1
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DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellants this
/\j-

day of May, 1975, to William C. Quigley, Attorney for Respon-

dents, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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